Income inequality: The aftermath of stock market liberalization in emerging markets by Das, Mitali & Mohapatra, Sanket
 Columbia University 
 
Department of Economics 













Income Inequality:  The Aftermath of Stock Market 





















Department of Economics 
Columbia University 
New York, NY 10027 
March 2002 
Columbia University 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0102-42 












Early research has documented that the large scale equity market liberalizations of the 
last decade led the subsequent rise in aggregate equity indices, investment booms, capital 
flows and economic growth. An important and unaddressed issue is the normative 
question of whether and how these reforms shifted the distribution of incomes in the 
aftermath of equity market liberalization. In careful empirical analysis, we find a pattern 
indicating that income share growth accrued almost wholly to the top quintile of the 
income distribution at the expense of a “middle class” that we define as the three middle 
quintiles of the income distribution. A surprising finding is that the lowest income share 
remained effectively unchanged in the event of liberalization. These patterns are robust to 
the inclusion of a wide variety of controls for global shocks, country specific factors, and 
contemporaneously implemented privatization and stabilization policies. 
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21. Introduction
In the latter half of the 1980s and the early years of the 1990s, the governments of over two dozen
sovereign nations began to implement a wave of major economic reforms, which included capital account
liberalization, privatization and/or a host of stabilization policies. This large-scale experiment has fuelled an
active academic and popular debate on the causes and consequences of these reforms, in part because the
aftermath of such reforms is important to nations which, to date, are considering liberalizing reforms.
Empirical evidence on the consequences of these reforms will therefore be an important tool in assessing how
best to implement similar liberalization policies in reform-minded countries.
In this context, a nascent but important body of empirical research has begun to emerge, analyzing
important questions such as the relation of capital account liberalization to (i) emerging market equity prices
(e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Kim and Singal (2000), Henry (2000a), Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes
(2000)), (ii) liquidity (Levine and Zervos (1998)), (iii) private investment (Levine and Zervos (1998), (Henry
(2000b), Bekaert and Harvey (2000)), (iv) equity flows (Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002), and (v)
economic growth (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001)). This literature has found strong evidence that
suggests capital account liberalization is associated with higher equity prices, lower cost of capital,
investment booms, greater capital flows and higher growth.
To date, an important but unaddressed question in this literature is the issue of whether and how these
reforms have shifted the distribution of incomes in the reforming countries. This is an important area of
research for several reasons. For example, the finding in Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2000) that average
economic growth increased after liberalization raises normative issues about the allocation of the generated
wealth. One would presumably evaluate the success of liberalizing reforms differently when average growth
uniformly raised incomes for all quantiles of the distribution, from a finding that the average growth post
liberalization was only influenced by gains to the upper tails of the income distribution. For many countries
that are still considering capital account liberalization, it is important to evaluate the benefits of market
liberalization such as investment booms relative to the potential downsides of such policy reforms, so that
future reforms may be tailored to alleviate any negative fallout from undertaking such economic reforms.
3This paper takes a step in this direction by presenting the first set of results on the association of
capital account liberalization with income inequality. In this paper, we heuristically and empirically describe
the dynamics of the shifts in income distributions in a sample of 11 countries that undertook extensive
economic reforms between 1986-1995.1 Prior to our discussion of the empirical work, we consider various
mechanisms that link capital account liberalization to income inequality. We do not intend these mechanisms
to be causal in either direction, but to provide a framework in which the finding of an empirical link between
the two variables should not necessarily be discarded as spurious.
We analyze income distribution changes by comparing the size of three income shares before and
after liberalization, conditional on a set of country-specific factors, and contemporaneous global shocks. We
study the share of GDP held by the top quintile, the lowest quintile, and a group we will henceforth refer to as
the middle class, which represents the sum of the three middle quintiles. Because we track the changes in
income shares which plausibly respond slowly to economic reforms (relative to equity prices or the dividend
yield), we analyze movements in the distribution over the “short run”, which we take as the first 2-4 years
beyond the year of the first liberalizing reform. This aspect of the analysis is discussed in more detail when
we present our methodological framework and the construction of event windows. We focus mainly on
capital account liberalization, but also control for other reforms such as privatization and stabilization policies
that were contemporaneously implemented. We will use the terms financial market liberalization, stock
market liberalization and capital account liberalization synonymously for our purposes. Regression results in
this study are given both for simple linear models as well as event-study models, which are somewhat
incongruous in this context but useful nevertheless.
The principal findings of this research indicate systematic shifts in the income distribution in the first
four years after a country’s first liberalization reform. First, the raw data indicate that in the 11 emerging
markets we consider, 9 experienced a growth in the top quintile’s share of income, and the mean share held
by the top quintile rose by 1.3 percentage points. Second, one mildly surprising finding is that there is no
discernible change in the mean income share of the lowest quintile. In the sample of 11 countries, 4
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 Data for the remaining countries are noisy and sparse.  Details of the  data are given in Section 2 of the
paper.
4experience declines in the lowest quintile’s income share, 7 experience growth, and the mean share held by
this group rises by 0.1 percent, which is statistically indiscernible from zero in regression analysis. This
finding supports a recent finding in Dollar and Kraay (2000) that income growth of the poor is one-for-one
with mean income growth of the population, which implies a constant income share for the poor. Based on
these two strands of evidence and a basic adding-up theorem, there must be a reduction in the aggregate
income share held by the middle class in the aftermath of capital account liberalization, and we find this to be
the case. Specifically, in 9 of the 11 emerging markets in the sample, the aggregate income share of the
middle class falls after liberalization. The raw data indicate a mean reduction of 1.45 percentage points in
their share of income.
We test this pattern in careful regression analysis, to control for variations in domestic fundamentals,
contemporaneous domestic and global business cycle effects, and country-specific effects. The regression
results indicate that the income share of the middle class is strongly negatively associated with liberalization,
and this relation persists in the presence of a wide variety of controls. In general, this finding is strongest for
the 3rd quintile but holds statistically for the 2nd and 4th quintiles as well. In contrast, there is no statistically
significant relation between liberalization and the income share of the lowest quintile in the presence of a rich
set of controls. The empirical evidence for the upper quintile points to a positive and statistically significant
relation between its income share and the event of liberalization, in accordance with the raw mean increases
in their income shares. However, for certain regression specifications this relation attenuates. Because our
regression estimates are sensitive to the choice of the regressor vector, we report a variety of results. We do
not lend any causality interpretation to our results because of the well-known problems of identification.
Instead, all of our results are presented as conditional correlations, and are open to varying interpretations,
some of which we will discuss in the context of the regression results. It is important to stress that the
described patterns hold for income shares. In the sample of emerging markets we consider, average income of
5the top quintile rose in all 11 nations, average income of the middle class as well as the lowest quintile rose in
10 of 11 nations.2
The key results obtained in this research complement, and should be viewed in the context of, some
important research that precedes this, e.g., Levine and Zervos (1998), Henry (2000a, 2000b), Bekaert and
Harvey (2000) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001). For instance, our finding that average middle class
income share decreased while the average income share of the upper quintile simultaneously increased,
coupled with the finding in Bekaert et. al. (2000) that mean growth increased post liberalization, indicates that
the “pie grew” upon liberalization, but that the generated wealth was disproportionately allocated to the upper
tail, suggesting a mean-increasing distributional shift. Without the result in Bekaert et. al., our finding could
not reject the hypothesis that liberalization leads greater inequality with a mean-reducing distributional shift.
The entire body of results jointly raises normative issues about capital account liberalization and the
subsequent welfare of the population, and questions of the trade-off in mean income growth and the
concomitant growth in inequality. Although the latter topics are of academic interest, they are not explicitly
discussed here, but will be addressed in future research.
To better comprehend the dynamics of these shifts in the distribution post liberalization, we
complement the regression analysis with nonparametric tests of stochastic dominance of the pre-liberalization
and post-liberalization income distributions. Logically, combining our results with that of Bekaert, Harvey
and Lundblad (2000) yields a very precise set of null hypotheses. First, patterns of income levels described in
the current research indicate that the average post-liberalization distribution of incomes should exhibit First
Order stochastic dominance (FOSD) over the pre-liberalization distribution. Similarly, SOSD should obtain.
Second, the finding that liberalization on average raises mean income growth in Bekaert et. al. (2000),
coupled with our finding that this growth appears to be driven entirely by the upper quintile, indicates that we
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 The only exception is Nigeria, where the upper quintile’s share of income after liberalization rose by 6.6
percentage points (a 13.6 percent increase), which is significantly higher than the mean increase of 1.3
percentage points in the upper quintile of all nations in the sample.
6should not reject Lorenz dominance.3 We provide formal tests of each of these hypotheses to provide a larger
context for the results of our regression analysis.
An important issue that often arises in studying emerging markets phenomena is that of dating a
country’s first liberalizing reform. In this respect, our research was aided greatly by Bekaert and Harvey (2000),
and Henry (1999, 2000a), whose work has compiled official liberalization dates on overlapping sets of the
sample of 11 liberalizing countries we consider.4 Also useful to this paper is the work of Deninger and Squire
(1996), that has assembled panel data on socioeconomic metrics for a large cross section of nations. Although
the focus of this research is on the association of financial reforms with income inequality, it is directly related
to the vast literature in growth that has studied amongst other issues, growth and income inequality (some
examples include Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Perotti (1996), Banerjee and Duflo (2000), and
Dollar and Kraay (2000)). This paper integrates some aspects of the growth research into studying emerging
markets phenomena, by exploring income inequality in the aftermath of stock market liberalization.
We will focus on the share of income owned by the jth quintile as the dependent variable for the
greater part of our empirical analysis (where j=l represents the lowest, j=h represents the highest quintile and,
aggregating the three middle quintiles yields a “middle class” with j=m). One might consider studying the
variation in the Gini coefficient of inequality to analyze income distributions pre- and post-liberalization; one
drawback of this measure, however, is its inability to distinguish between distributions that are unequal in
very different ways, e.g., thick-tailed at the upper end, versus thick-tailed at the lower. Furthermore, income
shares are the relevant variable to analyze in studying relative gains, and in inferring the process of resource
allocation in the liberalizing nation. Normative analyses about the welfare of the middle class whose income
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 Lorenz dominance, or mean-normalized second order stochastic dominance (SOSD) of income distribution
y1 over income distribution y2 implies that any social welfare function that is increasing and concave in
income will record higher levels of welfare in y1 than in y2; see Shorrocks (1983) or Litchfield (1999).
4
 As a referee has pointed out to us, the issue of dating liberalizing events is a somewhat unsettled matter in
the literature.  Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000a) are some of the primary sources, and Kim and
Singal (2000) is another. To limit the discrepancies that arise from using multiple sources, we have used data
from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and supplemented these with data from Henry (2000a) for those nations not
covered in the former. To verify the robustness of our results, we have re-estimated all models and reproduced
the figures with data from Kim and Singal (2000). This analysis has revealed noticeable differences in only
the individual country effects, and made the estimation less precise due to a much smaller set of nations in
Kim/Singal (only 6 nations in their data set have corresponding income shares). The graphs, and alternative
dates, are available upon request from us.
7share falls in the event of capital account liberalization must therefore be tempered to allow for the possibility
that the level of income in the middle class rises after liberalization. As indicated earlier, middle class income
increased contemporaneously with the decrease in their share of national income in 10 of the 11 nations in our
sample of liberalizing nations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the sample of emerging
market nations in our study, provide some preliminary findings, and describe various mechanisms that link
capital account liberalization with the observed changes in income shares. Section 3 describes our empirical
methodology; results from both standard regression analysis and event study models are reported here. In
Section 4, we discuss tests of stochastic dominance and Lorenz dominance, then describe the findings of our
tests. Section 5 considers whether it is possible to give a causality interpretation to our findings. Conclusions
follow. An appendix details the data construction of this study, and the construction of some of our test
statistics.
2. Capital Account Liberalization and Income Inequality
A. Sample of Liberalizing and Non-Liberalizing Nations
Listed in Table I, our panel data consist of 11 countries that underwent capital account liberalization
between 1986 and 1995, and a sample of 8 “control” countries that were subject to no major capital account
reforms in this time period. The liberalizing countries are Brazil, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Turkey. Although over two-dozen sovereign nations
implemented financial market liberalization in varying degrees in this time period, our sample is truncated for
unavailability of income share data. For example, only pre-liberalization income share data are available for
Chile and Morocco, while no income share data are available for other liberalizing countries such as
Argentina, Taiwan and Venezuela. The control countries in our sample are Bangladesh, Cote d'Ivoire,
Guatemala, Jamaica, Kenya, Niger, Sierra Leone and Trinidad and Tobago. The fact that these represent the
same regions as the liberalizing countries mitigates possible region-specific effects when comparing
distributions between the liberalizing and control countries.
8Annual income share data are compiled both from Deninger and Squire (1996) and the World
Income Inequality Database (WIID). These data, which are available for Ti years for county i, yield an
unbalanced panel for our data set. All stock market data, deflated by the price index, are taken from World
Bank Database on Financial Structure and Economic Development (FSED). Country specific data are
obtained from the World Bank’s Socioeconomic Time Series Access and Retrieval (STARS) database, and
rule of law data are from the IRIS data set. A description of the variables is provided in the Appendix. For
dates of first capital account liberalization, we lean on the careful dating procedures developed by Bekaert
and Harvey (2000), and Henry (1999, 2000a). The liberalization dates are presented in Table 1a. Summary
statistics of the key variables are in Table 1b. All data are measured at the annual frequency.
B. Mechanisms
There are a few important channels by which stock market liberalization could differentially affect
different income groups in the population. Standard international asset pricing models (e.g., Stulz (1995))
predict that global capital market integration may reduce the domestic cost of equity capital.5 Although the
domestic risk-free rate could rise above its autarky rate in the event of liberalization, research preceding ours
indicates that the equity premium falls in the sample of 12 emerging markets we consider (see, for example,
Tesar and Werner (1998), Stulz (1999b), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry (2000a)). If equity market
liberalization reduces the cost of equity capital, then holding future cash flows fixed, an immediate
implication is an increase in the country’s equity price index and, from a valuation perspective, capital gains
in the liberalizing country at least over the short horizon. However, if participation in the stock market is
segmented by income groups, then these gains will accrue only to those income groups that own equity, and
ceteris paribus the measured response to liberalization will be higher for those groups whose income depends
directly on the equity market. Although we have very sparse data on stock market participation in emerging
markets, there is anecdotal evidence to strongly suggest that equity ownership is largely restricted to the upper
income classes in the countries we sample (e.g., Beim and Calomiris, 1999).
9Over the short horizon, stock market liberalization may also differentially impact the different
income groups if access to credit markets is disparate within the population. By reducing the cost of capital,
stock market liberalizations increase the net present valuation (NPV) of ongoing investments, while also
rendering previous negative NPV projects feasible under a lowered cost of external finance.6 Since there is
evidence that growth is strongly positively associated with lowered cost of financing (see Rajan and Zingales
(1996)), there will be a measured increase in income via entrepreneurial wealth and retained earnings
following the event of stock market liberalization. However, if credit market imperfections limit lower
income groups’ access to credit, as in the models of Galor and Zeira (1993), and Ray (1998), such gains will
be disproportionately allocated to the groups with better access to bank credit and external financing.
Capital account liberalization may also lead to distributional changes by affecting factors
unobservable to the analyst. For example, the implementation of stock market liberalization might signal a
change in domestic fundamentals that leads firms to expect a better environment for growth, as hypothesized
in Bartolini and Drazen (1997). Improved expectations might be particularly strong for firms that are closely
tied to the domestic government because they are in the best position to appropriate the gains from capital
market integration, as implied by the rent-seeking models of Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1996). In
particular, favored firms or investors may receive better information, or explicitly influence reforms that reap
private benefits. To the extent that members of the upper income quintiles are tightly linked with the domestic
governments, these factors should most strongly impact their income shares post liberalization. Therefore, an
a priori assumption is that the measured income of the upper quantiles will be inflated via this channel. If
these groups undertake investments because they have private information of their prospects, then one would
observe an increase in their mean income share even after controlling for contemporaneous increases in stock
market valuation and investment. One might speculate, in the spirit of the Kuznets’s (1955) inverted-U
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 For instance, the presence of domestic investment opportunities could lead to net capital inflows that lower
the riskless rate; and, greater risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors could result in reducing the
risk premium (e.g., Errunza and Losq (1985)).
6
 Henry (2000b) finds evidence that stock market liberalization leads investment booms.
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hypothesis7 that stock market liberalization leads to improvements in the upper tails of the distribution at the
early stage of stock market development, while the lower quintiles gain over time.
The preceding discussion is intended to indicate possible links between liberalizing reforms and
changes in income shares. We do not press on the issue of causality since liberalizations are rarely
implemented in a vacuum, as discussed in the next section. Rather, the above discussion intends to convey the
notion that were liberalizations implemented exogenously, there are mechanisms by which they may directly
or indirectly affect income shares. We will investigate the empirical links between income shares and
liberalization in the next section. Prior to discussing the methodological framework employed in the
regression analysis, we present some preliminary findings.
C. Preliminary Findings
The central findings of this research are summarized in Figure 1a. These graphs, which display mean
income shares pre- and post-liberalization, reveal three main shifts in the income distribution in the first four
years after a country’s first liberalization reform.8 First, in almost all countries in the sample, income shares
of the highest quintile increased in the four years post liberalization. Second, there is a (weak) reduction in
aggregate income shares of the three middle quintiles, in varying degrees, in the aftermath of stock market
liberalization. Third, there is a mixed reaction for the lowest income group for our sample, as this share rose
in some countries in the sample, and fell in other countries. In particular, the mean increase in the countries
where the lowest income share rose is found to be statistically indistinguishable from the mean decrease in
those countries where the lowest income share fell, making it difficult to detect any meaningful shift in their
income share in the event of liberalization.
As a comparison, we also plot the income shares in non-liberalizing countries in Figure 1b. Because
there is no liberalization date, we pick the break point to be 1989 (which is the median liberalizing year in our
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 Kuznet’s hypothesis is an initial rise in inequality with economic progress and then a gradual fall as the
benefits of growth permeate more widely.
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 Where possible the means are computed over the four year preceding and four years following the first year
of liberalization. For those nations with fewer than four years of data before and after liberalization (see Table
1a), individual means are computed over as many observations available.
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sample) and compare income shares before and after 1989.9 The idea of using a common break point has
previously been studied in Levine and Zervos (1985). As Figure 1b indicates, there is no striking pattern that
emerges in income shares of non-liberalizing nations in this time period. Highest income quintiles both rise
and fall after the breakpoint, and similarly for the middle income quintiles. The lowest quintile shares
uniformly rise after the breakpoint.
The fact that income shares of the top quintiles grow, while those of the remaining quintiles shrink or
remain stable, indicates a growth in inequality in the nations studied. Another way to examine whether
inequality grew after liberalization is examine the size of the well-known Gini coefficient of inequality before
and after liberalization. This is done in Table 2 and the results corroborate our hypothesis.
The preliminary findings, based on Figure 1a, 1b and Table 2, indicate that the income distribution is
altered in the event of a liberalizing reform. We investigate this pattern more thoroughly in the context of
regression analysis in the next section.
3. Empirical Methodology
Two empirical strategies are used to study the empirical links between capital account liberalization
and income inequality. In this section we attempt to uncover the relation between liberalization and income
shares using regression analysis, and an event-study model that permits a diffused effect of liberalization on
income shares. In the following section, we verify the changes in income distribution implied by the
regression results, by tests of stochastic dominance and Lorenz dominance of the income distribution.
A. Income Shares and Stock Market Liberalization
As indicated in the discussion of the mechanisms that link capital account liberalization to income
inequality, valuation and capitalization changes in the local equity market after a liberalizing reform may be
an immediate link between income shares and liberalization. Therefore, controlling for variations in equity
markets across emerging markets, and over time within them, is expedient. We focus on two measures of
equity market activity, that have been previously been considered  (e.g., Atje and Jovanovic (1993), Levine
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and Zervos (1998) and Bekaert et. al. (2000)). For an indicator of the activity in a local equity market, we use
the actual dollar valuation of stock traded normalized by the local GDP. We also control for the size (or,
financial sector development) of the local market using the equity market capitalization normalized by GDP.
The regression framework explicitly accommodates a delayed effect of stock market variables on
income shares. As in Barro (1990) and Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993), both contemporaneous and
lagged values of stock market and income variables will be utilized. Strictly speaking, the association of year
t revaluations of the equity market with year t income shares is not “contemporaneous” in these data, because
these data are annual averages.10
The first set of conditional correlations are obtained from estimating variants of the regression model:
Qjit  i  t  	

it + X’it + δ1 * SMCit + δ2 * SMCit-1






policytion liberalizaaccountcapitalfirstsi’afteryearanyorofyearisyear t if 1
itlizePostLibera
i indexes the country, t indexes the year, SMC represents our measure of equity market size and SMV (an
acronym for stock market valuation) will denote our measure of equity market activity described earlier. X is
a vector of country-specific controls that include the contemporaneous and lagged values of the logarithm of
per capita GDP, secondary school enrollment, government consumption, gross investment, and one measure
of the “rule of law” as in Alesina and Rodrik (1995).11  To partially capture differences in credit markets, a
measure of banking sector development (measured by aggregate private credit normalized by GDP) is added
as well. The liberalization indicator is included in addition to the year dummies to isolate the effects of
liberalization from those of contemporaneous global or regional shocks.
Panel (A) in Table 3 (a) reports regressions of Qj  (j=l,m,h) on the liberalization indicator and a full
set of year dummies and country-specific effects, yielding conditional mean differences in income shares pre-
and post-liberalization. The results show a strong positive (respectively, negative) relationship between
                                                          
10
 This accommodates the possibility that changes in the equity market earlier in the year are associated with
income changes later in the year.
13
liberalization and Qh  (respectively, Qm ). In Column (1) the coefficient on PostLiberalizet implies a mean
increase of 3.6 percentage points in the income share of the highest quintile after liberalization. Column (2)
indicates a mean decrease of 3.1 percentage points in the Qm regression. In Column (3) the coefficient is
significant, but at a much higher error level, pointing to a 0.5 percentage point increase in the income share of
the lowest quintile. Together these results corroborate the pattern found in Figure 1. However, these
differences are larger in absolute value than the simple averages of income shares before and after
liberalization, indicating that unobservable country-specific factors and contemporaneous global or regional
shocks may be correlated with the decision to liberalize. This issue is further researched below where the
regression model controls for coincidental implementation of major domestic reforms.
Panel (B) of Table 3 (a) presents results when the above model is supplemented with a wide variety
of controls for variations in equity market, banking sector and domestic fundamentals. These results show that
while the basic pattern that emerged in Panel (A) persists in the presence of the additional covariates, the
magnitude of that pattern is inflated with the additional controls, as evinced by the absolute value on
PostLiberalizet. Furthermore, the coefficient on PostLiberalize is no longer significant in Column (6). In
Column (5), controlling for equity market size via SMCt, the coefficient on SMVt is found to be negative and
significant, suggesting that equity market activity is inversely associated with the middle class’s share of
income. Concurrently, the coefficient on SMVt is positive in Column (6), suggesting that the upper quintile’s
income share is affected by contemporaneous changes in equity revaluation. One possible mechanism for this
finding is that greater equity market activity could plausibly reflect the greater willingness of participants to
hold assets, and this leads to equity price appreciation, benefiting the upper quintile (who are the typical
owners of equity in the sample we consider). The results reveal no statistical association between the lowest
income quintile and equity market activity; correspondingly, the point-estimates on SMVt in the Qh  and Qm
regressions approximately sum to zero. Neither do the results reveal any statistical association between lagged
values of equity market measures and income shares. Since liberalizations are associated with higher
aggregate stock prices (Henry (2000a)), these results are consistent with a scenario in which the upper income
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quintile disproportionately participates in the equity market, accruing the capital gains from equity
revaluation.
Some discussion of the additional regressors is warranted. We note that the measure of the banking
sector development, PrivateCreditt, is statistically insignificant in all specifications. Nevertheless, the central
tendency of the estimator is positive for each of the Qm and Ql  regressions indicating, perhaps, that banking
sector development leads to better access for lower income groups, as discussed in Section 2(B). In a related
vein, the coefficient on SMCt is worth further analysis. Suppose that growth in the financial sector is
associated with greater stock market participation. Although we do not have data on participation, there is
some casual evidence that participation is largely restricted to the upper quintiles in emerging markets (see
Beim and Calomiris, 1999). Growth in the financial sector might therefore be associated with a greater share
of the middle class’ participation in the equity market, which would divert some fraction of the short-run
capital gains from liberalization to the middle class. In this scenario, we would observe both, a positive
coefficient on SMCt for the middle class, and a negative coefficient for the upper quintile. This is found to be
the case in Columns (5) and (4) respectively.
In Table 3 (b) we consider a small extension of the previous results by investigating how the income
distribution is affected by differences in the strength of legal institutions/government stability, by introducing
the interaction Rule of Lawt*PostLiberalizet. Essentially, the hypothesis is that although stock market
liberalization has been found to positively affect income shares, the efficacy of such liberalizing policies
might depend on the perceived and actual stability of the government and other legal institutions. In Table
3(b) we find that this is indeed the case, although the hypothesis is statistically verified only for the top
quintile. Specifically, we find that while a generic discrete jump in Rule of Law from 0 to 1 (i.e., anarchy to
fully accountable) would result in a 8.2 percent appreciation in the top quintile’s income share, a liberalized-
induced jump in Rule Of Law would result in a larger 9.3 percent appreciation of the top quintile’s income
share. However, we are unable to statistically discern such a pattern for any of the other income shares.
B. Liberalization-induced Changes in Income Shares
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The results in Table 3 (a) indicate that equity market revaluations affect income shares independently
of liberalizing reforms, since the liberalizing indicator is a control variable in the estimated regression model.
A legitimate question to consider is whether the association of income shares and equity market activity is
systematically different prior and subsequent to liberalization. It is plausible that liberalization-induced
revaluations in equity markets elicit different responses from investors than generic changes in equity market
revaluations. This is plausible because the event of a liberalizing reform signals fundamental changes that
lead firms to expect a better environment for growth, as discussed in Bartollini and Drazen (1997). For
example, Henry (2000a) finds that private investment is differentially associated with liberalization-specific
and generic changes in the rate of return.
 To test this hypothesis, the above regression model was modified as follows:
Qjit  i  t  	

it + X’it + δ1 SMCit  +
δ2 * SMCit-1  +δ3 * SMVit + δ4 * SMVit-1
+ δ5* SMVit*PostLiberalizeit + δ6* SMVit-1*PostLiberalizeit it.
The inclusion of the interactive variables permits a differential slope effect of equity market activity
prior and subsequent to a nation’s liberalizing reform. In particular, if liberalization-induced changes in stock
market activity have fundamentally different implications for incomes from generic changes in stock market
valuation, then we must find that δ5 , and δ6. Estimated results are presented in Table 4.
The coefficients on both contemporaneous SMVt, as well as its interaction with the liberalization
indicator are both statistically significant at the 10 percent error level, but of differing signs. In the Qm
regression, the coefficients δ3  and δ5  jointly indicate that while a generic 10 percent increase in equity market
activity leads to a  2.8 percentage point decrease in Qm, a liberalization-induced change of the same
magnitude leads to a somewhat larger decrease of  3.5 percentage points. The results reject neither the
hypothesis that δ4=0 nor δ6=0, indicating that changes in equity market revaluation in the preceding year
have no statistically significant effect on Qm. Similarly, the results indicate that a 10 percent increase in equity
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market activity tends to have a liberalization-induced increase in Qh that is 2.6 percentage points higher than
that for a generic 1 percent increase in trading activity. As with Qm, there is no observed statistical association
between the lagged measure of stock market activity and changes in the upper quintile’s income share. The
data also do not support any effects of changes in equity market activity before or after liberalization on the
lowest income share.
A model of differential access to credit markets across income groups may reconcile the
liberalization-induced slope effects found in Table 4. Since investment is i) spurred after liberalization and ii)
more sensitive to liberalization-specific changes rather than generic changes in valuations (Henry (2000b)),
liberalizing reforms are likely to lead to greater entrepreneurial wealth and retained earnings via the
investment channel. However, as discussed earlier, segmented access to credit markets may result in these
gains accumulating disproportionately to higher income groups. The differential slopes are also consistent
with a story of the improved expectations after liberalizing reforms due, for example, to higher risk-sharing
(see Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Bartollini and Drazen (1997),). If liberalization does portend a differential
association of changes in equity market valuations with income shares, then a differential association must
also emerge between liberalizing nations and non-liberalizing nations. We test this hypothesis next.
C. Income Shares in Non-Liberalization Nations
A natural concern is that the results obtained in Tables 3(a) and 4 are driven, not by liberalizing
reforms in the emerging markets, but rather by world or regional business cycle effects that are not adequately
captured by year dummies.12 If global economic changes are contemporaneously affecting all nations (or
regional ones are affecting all nations in the particular region), including those that did not implement any
reforms in this time-period, it may be difficult to conclude that liberalization has any statistical effect on
income shares. Here we conduct a simple regression test to determine the validity of this alternative
explanation.
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The indicator NonLiberalize, which does not vary over time in our sample, takes on the value 1 for
the set of “control” nations listed in Table 1a. These controls should help mitigate the presence of
unobservable regional differences between the controls and the liberalizing nations because both sets of
countries represent the same world regions.
The results for variations of this model are given in Table 5.  In Panel (A) we report results for a
regression model with no interaction variables. In Column (1), the coefficient on NonLiberalize is positive but
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the highest income quintile in control nations are approximately as
well off as the same class in liberalizing nations. It is possible to reconcile this result with Figures 1a and 1b.
However, in Column (2) the coefficient on NonLiberalize is positive and statistically significant, indicating
that the middle class in control nations actually fares better than its counterpart in liberalizing nations. A
similar result is found for the lowest income quintile group in Column (3). In both Columns (1) and (2),
PostLiberalizet is robust to the addition of the NonLiberalize indicator in both sign and magnitude.
In Panel (B) we extend the estimation idea of Section 3(B), by testing for differential slope effects in
non-liberalizing versus liberalizing nations. Column (5) shows that the inclusion of the interactive variables
reduces the magnitude as well as the statistical significance of NonLiberalize in the Qm regression. Its
statistical significance is retained in Column (6), where its magnitude is also slightly increased. Our primary
interest is in the joint effect of the contemporaneous and lagged values of SMV and their interaction with
NonLiberalize.
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
12
 Although Figure 1b indicated no particular pattern in the change in income shares for non-liberalizing
nations, that illustration was given for an arbitrary break point year (1989). Further, Figure 1b is a useful
summary of the data but does not control for country specific factors or year effects.
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In Column (4), the results are somewhat robust to the inclusion of the interaction variable. The
coefficient on SMVt is significantly estimated at 0.206. While the coefficient on NonLiberalize*SMVt is
insignificant at conventional levels, something can still be said.  The point-estimates indicate that a 10 %
increase in equity market activity i) raises the upper quintile’s income share in liberalizing nations13 by 2.06
percentage points, but ii) decreasing Qh by 0.78 percentage points in non-liberalizing countries; a result we
qualify by stating that the obtained estimates are significant only at the 85th percentile.
In Column (5), NonLiberalize*SMVt is estimated to be positive and statistically significant, while the
coefficient on the contemporaneous variable SMVt is estimated as negative and statistically significant. These
results jointly indicate that i) a 10 % increase in equity market valuation results in lowering middle class
income shares in liberalizing nations by 1.9 percentage points, but ii) the same 10% increase in valuation is
associated with an increase of  0.0045 (=.2035-.1991) percentage points in the middle class income share in
non-liberalized nations. Although this is a statistically significant result, the implied numbers are
economically less significant, i.e., they suggest that the change in middle class income shares is close to zero
in non-liberalizing nations. The coefficients on the lagged value of equity valuation, SMVt-1, as well as its
interaction with the non-liberalizing indicator are estimated imprecisely, and cannot be distinguished from
zero.
Overall, we find support for the hypothesis that increases in equity market activity are associated
with income shares differentially in liberalizing versus non-liberalizing nations. However, this relationship is
estimated less precisely and attenuates to zero for the highest income share Qh.14
D. The Staggered Effect of Liberalization
The next set of results is reported for models styled in the standard “event-study” specification pioneered in
Eckbo (1983). Event study models are somewhat atypical for the current context because in contrast to changes in
                                                          
13
 The slope effect of a change in stock market valuation is given as δ3 +δ5SMV¸or, a δ3 change in liberalizing
nations, and a δ3+δ5  effect in non-liberalizers.
14
 One might also directly test whether Figure 1b is confirmed in the data by a simple regression of income
shares on an indicator that takes on the value 1 for the breakpoint year or thereafter, and 0 otherwise. We find
that such regressions are sensitive to the choice of the breakpoint year. Further, the breakpoint year is
arbitrary and with no economic significance for these control nations so we do not report those results.
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stock price valuations, we expect financial market liberalization to have continuous, diffused effects on income and
income distributions, rather than discrete jump effects along the time line. Nevertheless, in keeping with some of the
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and X constitutes a set of control variables used in Tables 3-5 such as GovtConsumptiont,
SecondaryEnrollmentt and Rule of Lawt. We replace the year dummies with a measure of regional GDP
growth to account for some of the regional business cycle effects. The latter is a useful substitution, as the
number of coefficients to estimate in this model increases linearly with the parameter K. 15
The major statistical difference afforded by the event study analysis relative to the linear regression
model is its accommodation of a staggered effect of liberalization on income shares for K periods beyond the
first year of liberalization. Pooling all post-liberalization years together, as in Bekaert et. al. (2000), is
informative about mean differences before and after liberalization, but cannot separate the finer differences
across these years. Although we experimented with a grid of values for K=0,1,2,…,6, the reported results are
for K=4 because the addition of every additional year beyond K=4 was found to have no power in explaining
the variance in Qj, (j=l,m,h).
Staggering the effects of liberalization could also be useful in speculating about the source of the
changes in shares. For an extreme example, suppose the upper quintile’s income were completely linked with
the equity market. Then, based on the evidence in Henry (2000a) that liberalization leads a rise in emerging
market equity prices, one would expect instantaneous changes in their income shares in the event of
liberalization, and a coefficient on PostLiberalizet that is significantly different from zero. Alternatively, if the
changes in income depend on realized profits from private investments, it is plausible that the measured
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  One point of concern is that the number of regressors in this model will grow quite fast, limiting precision.
To address this concern, we pared down the set of regressors in this model to those that we deem are the most
important, from Table 3(a). We find that making the relevant change makes our estimates more precise.
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response of liberalization is diffused over time, such that the coefficients on PostLiberalizet+k  (k=1,2,…) are
different from zero, while the coefficient on PostLiberalizet  is not.
Table 6 presents the results of estimating the model above. The first row, which presents robust
regression estimates of the model above, indicates that in the year of liberalization the top quintile’s share
(Qh) is positively affected, being 2.2 percent above its non-liberalization mean. This strand of evidence is
consistent with the notion that gains to the upper quintile may be realized imminently after liberalization
because of the instantaneous reaction of equity markets, whose valuation directly affects holders of equity.
Because increases in one share must be offset by decreases in one or more of the other income shares, we
expect coefficients on Qm and/or Ql to be negative, which is found to be the case in Columns (2) and (3). That
these coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero could arise for two reasons. First, sharp declines
within Qm and Ql in some countries may be offset by huge gains in Qm and Ql in others, leading to no
observed change in an average (i.e., regression) sense in these income shares. This explanation would be
consistent with the observed increase in Qh and the absence of an estimated decline in Qm  and Ql. An
alternate explanation is that the offsetting declines are felt in narrower quantiles of the income distribution
than we consider. To explore this possibility, the regressions are re-estimated on each of the three components
that make up Qm , i.e, the second, third, and fourth quintiles that we abbreviate as Qm2 , Qm3  and Qm4. These
results are reported in Panel (B) of Table 6.
We find that in the first year of liberalization, there is a statistically significant negative effect on the
income share Qm3, which is the center of the “middle class” income share, offsetting the rise in the income
share of the top quintile. The point estimate suggests that the income share of this group fell 1.2 percentage
points, while there was no significant effect on either Qm2, or Qm4 . This finding reconciles the apparent lack
of decline in the aggregate measure Qm. It is also plausible that the observed gains to the upper quintile are
driven by gains to a much narrower group than to the entire upper quintile; however, as there is no data on
say, deciles, this hypothesis cannot be verified empirically.
The results of Table 6 indicate that while some movements in income shares are observed as early as
the year of liberalization, much of the changes occur over the next 2 years and diminish thereafter. The results
indicate that the upper quintile’s income share is 4.2 and 2.4 percentage points larger than the sample mean in
21
the first and second year after liberalization respectively, as seen by the coefficients on PostLiberalizet+1 that
and PostLiberalizet+2. Contemporaneously offsetting these gains, the middle class income share falls 2.9 and
2.8 percentage points in the first and second years after liberalization respectively. In the first year after
liberalization, the lowest income share, Ql, also falls 0.4 percent. It is interesting to note that in the second
year after liberalization where there is no discernible effect on Ql, the gains to Qh exactly offsets the reduction
in Qm. In each of the third and fourth years after liberalization there is no statistically discernible conditional
mean difference in any of the income shares.
E.  Contemporaneous Reforms
One concern in empirically isolating the impact of capital account liberalization is that of controlling
for the contemporaneous implementation of other economic or political reforms which might systematically
influence the “climate” for growth. Henry (2000a) documents that, with very few exceptions, nations that
undertook capital account liberalization coincidentally implemented stabilization and trade liberalization
policies, accelerated privatization, and lifted restrictions on exchange rates. King and Levine (1993), Rajan
and Zingales (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998) indicate that growth is strongly associated with development
in the banking sector. Without controlling for coincidental domestic reforms or world business cycle effects
that are themselves associated with changes in the income distribution, a regression framework would
misrepresent the association of stock market liberalization with changes in income shares, if such co-
movements are inadequately captured by year dummies.
To address this concern, the regression model in Section 3(A) is supplemented with additional
controls for specific domestic reforms. Because we find in Table 6 that beyond the second year after
liberalization the effects are insignificant both economically and statistically, we consider only the two years
subsequent to the year of implementing capital account liberalization. Data on the other major domestic
reforms in the emerging markets are from Henry (2000a). With these data, (for k=1,2), we add indicator
variables for stabilization policies (Stabilizet+k), slackening of exchange rate restrictions (Exchanget+k) and the
implementation of privatization reforms (Privatizet+k). These variables are defined analogously to
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PostLiberalizet+k.16, taking on the value 1 if it is the (t+k)th year after the reform was implemented, and 0
everywhere else.
Results from estimating the modified regression model are given in Table 7. We find that relative to
Table 6, the coefficient on the PostLiberalizeit indicator becomes significant in the Qm regression and its
statistical significance is retained in the the Qh regression. Note that both these coefficients are more positive
relative to their estimates in Table 6. This result is evidence that implementation of the other major domestic
reforms is positively correlated to a liberalizing reform. We find that stabilization policies appear to have their
strongest effect a year after they are implemented, as indicated by the significant coefficient on Stabilizet. The
results indicate that stabilization policies are in general beneficial to the lower income classes. Likewise, the
effects of privatization reforms are felt with a year’s lag as seen in the coefficients of Privatizet+1 in both
Columns (1)-(2). Privatization reforms, whose effects are an order of magnitude smaller than that of
stabilization programs are positively associated with the upper quintile, and negatively with the middle class.
As with both the above policies, the easing of exchange restrictions also affects income shares with a lag; the
results discern strong effects in both the first and second year after more lax exchange rate restrictions are
implemented as seen in the coefficients of Exchanget+1 and Exchanget+2.
Table 7 indicates that it is important to control for contemporaneous domestic programs of
stabilization, privatization policies and the easing of exchange rate restrictions. Importantly, the coefficients
on the PostLiberalize indicators are statistically significant even after controlling for these other reforms,
which themselves impact income shares. We infer that the implementation of the other major domestic
reforms is positively correlated with capital account liberalization because of the direction in which the
coefficients of the PostLiberalize indicators change relative to Table 6. In general, capital account
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 These data are from Henry (2000a). “Stabilization programs” refers to programs enacted to require stricter
and more transparent monetary policy, lifting of price and exchange rate controls, steps taken to prevent
federal and state banks from money printing and “large” public debt rescheduling. Analogously,
“privatization” is a term reserved explicitly for actual privatization of firms, and/or steps taken to accelerate
privatization practices already in place including the enactment of official laws to permit private individuals
into industries earlier reserved for the government, and the transfer of ownership to private individuals,
including foreign ownership. “Exchange” refers to a significant easing of foreign exhange restrictions (e.g.,
easier profit remittance for foreign firms in Venezuela in 1989). Additional details are documented in Henry
(2000a)
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liberalization appears to impact income shares contemporaneously and up to 2 years after liberalization, while
other reforms have no contemporaneous effect.
4. Measures of Stochastic and Lorenz Dominance
The regression analysis presents evidence that higher income groups benefited unambiguously post-
liberalization, with growths in their income share surpassing the growth in mean income, while the middle
class unambiguously suffered lowered income shares. However, as discussed earlier, this result must be
qualified with the fact that with very few exceptions, income levels grew almost uniformly in all income
classes in our sample. In this section, we revert to studying income levels using standard measures of
stochastic and Lorenz dominance to empirically verify the shifts in income distributions from the pre-
liberalization to post-liberalization era.
The three dominance measures discussed below are first order stochastic dominance (FOSD),
second-order stochastic dominance (SOSD) and Lorenz dominance, also called mean-normalized second
order stochastic dominance. Since the purpose is to compare inequality before and after financial
liberalization, we are primarily interested in the concept of Lorenz dominance. However, comparisons using
first- and second-order stochastic dominance are also presented since these give a broad picture of the mean
changes in the income distribution during the process of financial liberalization. Based on the empirical
finding from the regressions, we expect i) the post-liberalization distribution to be characterized by FOSD and
SOSD relative to the pre-liberalization distribution, while ii) Lorenz dominance should not hold for the
pooled sample of liberalizing countries. We use a method known as the “p-approach to dominance”, where
the measures of dominance can be expressed in terms of quantiles (Davidson and Duclos, 2000). Although
income quintiles are a rough approximation to the actual income distribution, they are nevertheless useful in
comparing the broad patterns of income distribution before and after liberalization.
Denote the cumulative distribution function of the inflation-adjusted incomes of the representative
individuals prior to and subsequent to liberalization as FA and FB respectively. FB first order stochastically
dominates (FOSD) distribution FA if and only if FB(y) ≤ FA(y). Let I  denote income. For the pth quintile,
FOSD is equivalent to verifying whether IA(p) ≤ IB(p), i.e.,  whether the representative individual in each
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quintile is better off in the post-liberalization distribution than in the pre-liberalization distribution. SOSD is
implied by FOSD. The test for SOSD entails verifying whether CIA(p) ≤ CIB(p), for each p, where CIA(p) and
CIB(p) denote the mean cumulative income up to the pth quintile of distributions A and B respectively. Figures
2a and 2b illustrate the shifts in income distribution using these two measures of dominance for the combined
sample of liberalizing countries before and after financial liberalization. The evidence seems to be
overwhelmingly in favor of first-order (and hence second order) stochastic dominance. A similar exercise for
individual countries yields similar results with FOSD holding for 10 out of the 11 countries, and mean
inflation-adjusted incomes of each of the quintiles increasing by more than 5 percent in the 5-year window
after liberalization.
A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative income share of the bottom p-quantiles of the population against
p. Distribution B Lorenz-dominates distribution A if the Lorenz curve associated with distribution B lies
nowhere below and at least somewhere above that of A. Equivalently, distribution B dominates distribution A
if CFA(p) ≤ CFB(p), where CFA(p) and CFB(p) are the cumulative income shares up to the pth quintile of
distributions A and B respectively . Lorenz dominance can be interpreted as a shift in income distribution
where the representative individual in the poorest p-quintiles receives a greater share of the income in the new
state of nature after liberalization. We obtain Lorenz dominance for 2 and crossings for the rest 9 liberalizing
countries. Figure 2c illustrates the absence of Lorenz dominance for the combined sample of liberalizing
countries in the five-year window after financial liberalization.
The simultaneous empirical observance of FOSD and the absence of Lorenz dominance reinforce our
earlier conclusion that even though mean incomes increased for all the income groups post-liberalization, the
gains from liberalization were not equitably distributed. The aggregate dominance results, combined with our
regression analysis, make it highly likely that similar effects would be discernible at the micro-level as well
for most of the liberalizing countries in our sample.
5. Can a case be made for Causality?
Evidence from the regression analysis indicates that there are real statistical associations between the
occurrence of liberalization and the income shares of the highest quintile and the “middle class”. These
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relations persist statistically in the presence of controls for domestic fundamentals, world business cycle
movements and country-specific factors. They are also robust upon controlling for contemporaneously
implemented domestic stabilization and privatization reforms, and the easing up of exchange restrictions. The
results indicate that the highest income quintile benefits at the expense of a large middle class. The lowest
quintile’s income share remains unaffected, mirroring a recent finding in Dollar and Kraay (2000).
It is worth questioning whether the obtained results are simply a result of endogenous policy reforms
that lead to the usual identification problem in cross-country regressions. Consider the following scenario.
Suppose members of the upper quintile accurately predict a future positive shock to the marginal product of
capital and, recognizing that foreign capital flows will have beneficial price effects on equity, influence
policymakers to implement liberalizing reforms. Then, one would expect a rise in the upper quintile’s income
share due to the positive shock to the productivity of capital, and liberalization will have no causal role for
their higher income share, although liberalization will be positively correlated with the upper quintile’s
income share. This scenario is consistent with our empirical findings. In this case, the liberalization indicator
simply absorbs the effects of an unobserved variable representing expectations. In the absence of a
convincing way to control for such a possibility, we do not press on a causal role for liberalization.
To this end, we temper our findings in the following ways. First, if the decision to implement
liberalizing reforms was in correct anticipation of higher equity valuations in the future, then the obtained
results must be different in magnitude than the true association between liberalization and the income shares.
In particular, the documented statistical association between liberalization and the upper/middle income
shares may be larger than the true association.
Second, even in the absence of endogeneity, all our estimates are obtained conditional on the world
business cycle effects in place at the time of liberalization. As documented in Beim and Calomiris (1999), and
Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002), the late 1980s and early 1990s saw an unprecedented rise in capital
flows to emerging markets, at a time when global interest rates were fairly low. The rise in capital flows was
linked to the expansion of international finance fuelled by deregulation in many parts of the world as well as
technological advances in computing and risk analysis which supported the creation of global financial
institutions. Therefore, out-of-sample predictions for future liberalizers based on our results, must be
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tempered to account for future global conditions, such as high world real interest rates, which may not
facilitate large net flows to emerging markets.
On a related note, there may be an element of a “first-mover” advantage for the nations that
liberalized first. It is plausible that for the first set of liberalizing nations, foreign investors discounted the
importance of political uncertainties, judicial systems and the fragility of certain emerging market nations17
when investing in these countries. Over time, there is likely to more learning for international investors about
the nature of risk, as well as the political and legal institutions, in emerging markets. It is conceivable that
such learning result in a more cautious approach to emerging market investments in the future. Under this
scenario, one may observe a much less robust association of liberalization with incomes, or income shares
than has been documented in this paper.
Conclusions
This paper presents evidence of a strong statistical association between the event of liberalization and
income shares. The data strongly support a positive coefficient between liberalization and the highest income
quintile’s share of mean income, and a negative coefficient between liberalization and the middle class
income share. For our study, the middle class represents the aggregate sum of the three middle quintiles. We
find no evidence of any statistical association between liberalization and the lowest income quintile. Although
the middle class “suffers” in the wake of a liberalizing reform while the upper quintile gains, this statement is
true for income shares. We find that income levels in liberalizing nations almost universally rise after
liberalization. We provide tests of stochastic dominance of the pre- and post-liberalization income
distributions to complement our regression analysis.
The patterns we describe persist in the presence of a wide variety of controls for domestic
fundamentals, world business cycle movements and country-specific factors. They are also robust to the
addition of controls for contemporaneous domestic reforms. We find that equity revaluations affect income
                                                          
17
 Chile, Brazil and Venezuela are examples of the liberalizing markets that are relatively fragile. These
nations are heavily dependent on their undiversified export sectors, which makes their terms of trade highly
sensitive to fluctuations in commodity prices which can lead to the deterioration of their debt or equity values
(see Beim and Calomiris, 1999).
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shares differentially before and after liberalizations. They also affect income shares differentially across
liberalizing and non-liberalizing nations.
Because liberalizing and other major domestic reforms are rarely implemented in a vacuum, we do
not press on causality. It is possible that endogenous policy decisions will attenuate some of the
aforementioned correlations that we document. However, it is important to note that there are mechanisms
which should relate capital market liberalizations to income shares under a wide variety of hypotheses that are
true in emerging markets (e.g., differential access to credit markets, limited stock market participation, and
the tight links between upper quintiles and policy makers). In any event, the patterns we describe should
prove useful in the debate on emerging markets phenomena, and add to the research that analyzes the
aftermath of capital account liberalization in emerging markets.
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Appendix
Data Sources and Variable Glossary
Data Source and Variable
Name
Variable Description Detailed Variable Description
Deininger  and Squire and
WIID 2000
Q5 Income share of the
highest quintile
Income share accruing to the highest quintile of the population.
Income shares are constructed from reliable income or
expenditure data referring to the (entire) national population.
Q234 Income share of the
middle three quintiles
Sum of income shares accruing to the middle three quintiles of
the population.
Qm1 Income share of the
second quintile
Income share accruing to the second quintile of the population.
Qm2 Income share of the third
quintile
Income share accruing to the third quintile of the population.
Qm3 Income share of the
fourth quintile
Income share accruing to the fourth quintile of the population.
Ql Income share of the
lowest quintile







Stock market capitalization to GDP equals the value of listed
shares divided by GDP. Both numerator and denominator are
deflated appropriately, with the numerator equaling the average
of the end-of-year value for year t and year t-1., both deflated by
the respective end-of-year CPI, and the GDP deflated by the
annual value of the CPI.
SMV Stock Market
Valuation/GDP
Stock market valuation equals the value of total shares traded on
the stock exchange to GDP.
Private Credit Private credit by deposit
money banks and other
financial institutions to
GDP
Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions to GDP equals claims on the private sector by both
deposit money banks and other financial institutions divided by
GDP.
WDI STARS 2000
GDP GDP per capita, PPP
(current international $)
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). GDP
PPP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars
using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has
the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar in the
United States.
Govt. Consumption General government
consumption (% of
GDP)
General government consumption includes all current
government spending for purchases of goods and services
(including wages and salaries).
Secondary Enrollment School enrollment,
secondary (% gross)
Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless
of age, to the population of the age group that officially
32
corresponds to the level of education shown.
Terms of trade Terms of trade
adjustment (constant
LCU)
The terms of trade effect equals capacity to import less exports
of goods and services in constant prices. Data are in constant
local currency.
IRIS-3
Rule of Law Rule of law indicator Rule of law contains annual values for the Rule of Law
indicator (on a scale of 0-6) for the years 1982-1997,
constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center, University
of Maryland, from monthly data from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG).
Notes:
1. WIID refers to the UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database 2000.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Changes in income shares around financial market liberalization
The dependent variable is the income share of the Qj th income group, where Qh, Qm and Ql are as defined in the text. The
regressors include PostLiberalizet is an indicator for liberalization , LnGDPt  and LnGDPt-1for the current and lagged values
of GDP respecitvely; SMCt and SMCt-1 denote the current and lagged values of normalized stock market capitalization
respectively, and SMVt and SMVt-1 denote the current and lagged values of normalized stock market valuation respectively.
Also included are a measure of banking sector development PrivateCreditt, measures of secondary schooling, Rule of law,
terms of trade, as well as country-specific dummies, and year dummies. The reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
consistent (White) and reported in parentheses.  * and ** respectively denote significance at the 10 and 5 percent error
levels.
(A) (B)
Qh Qm Ql Qh Qm Ql













































































Year Dummies      
Country Fixed Effects      
N 113 113 113 80 80 80
38
Table 3 (b)
Rule of Law and Liberalization: Differential Effects
This table reports results for a regression that replicates the regression model in 3(a), including all the regressors
from Table 3(a), plus an interaction between Rule of Lawt and PostLiberalizet. The reported standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-consistent (White) and reported in parentheses.  * and ** respectively denote significance at






















Year Dummies   
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